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methylated in young larvae, old larvae, 
and young pupae of Apis mellifera 
but for adults, this dropped to an 
average of 4.6%. Intriguingly, we also 
found evidence for variation between 
methylation states among individuals 
of the same species (Figure 2). Across 
species, 4 to 47 AFLP markers  
(mean = 20) were present with both  
restriction enzymes in at least one  
individual but varied between 
restriction enzymes in another 
individual. This is indicative of a 
restriction site that is not methylated 
in one individual but methylated in 
another. Similarly, for a small number of 
markers (0 to 15 per species, mean: 5) 
we found that while one individual had 
a fragment present when digested 
with MspI and absent when digested 
with HpaII, another individual showed 
the opposite pattern with a fragment 
present with HpaII and absent with 
MspI. This is indicative of a restriction 
site that is fully methylated in one 
individual but hemimethylated in 
another [10].
Our data reveal that CpG methylation 
is common in social insects but the 
overall amount of methylation varies 
across species and developmental 
stages. This baseline information sets 
the stage for a variety of important 
questions. For instance, does CpG 
methylation underlie imprinting in 
social insects? If so, does the variation 
in methylation we observe among 
species translate into variation in the 
extent of genomic imprinting? Finally, 
and most importantly, do patterns of 
methylation and imprinting across 
the social Hymenoptera support the 
kinship theory of imprinting? If so, this 
group of insects will provide novel 
experimental opportunities to study the 
evolution of genomic conflict.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data including experimental 
 procedures are available at http://www.current-
 biology.com/cgi/content/full/18/7/R287/DC1
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Figure 2. Example of methylation-sensitive 
AFLP profiles for two Polistes dominulus in-
dividuals.
(A) A fragment that is present with both restric-
tion enzymes in both individuals, indicating a 
fixed and unmethylated restriction site. (B) A 
fragment that is absent in one individual but 
present with both enzymes in another, indi-
cating a polymorphic and unmethylated re-
striction site. (C) A fragment that is present 
with only one restriction enzyme for both in-
dividuals, indicating a fixed and methylated 
restriction site. (D) A fragment that is present 
with both enzymes in one individual but only 
present with one enzyme in another individual, 
indicating a restriction site that is unmethyl-
ated in one but methylated in the other. (E) A 
fragment that is present with one enzyme in 
one individual but with the other enzyme in 
another individual, indicating a restriction site 
that is fully methylated in one but hemimethyl-
ated in the other. All markers are pictured at a 
y-axis scale of 1000 reflectance units.Imitation recognition 
in great apes
Daniel B.M. Haun1,2 and Josep Call1
Human infants imitate not only 
to acquire skill, but also as a 
fundamental part of social interaction 
[1–3]. They recognise when they 
are being imitated by showing 
increased visual attention to 
imitators (implicit recognition) and 
by engaging in so-called testing 
behaviours (explicit recognition). 
Implicit recognition affords the ability 
to recognize structural and temporal 
contingencies between actions across 
agents, whereas explicit recognition 
additionally affords the ability to 
understand the directional impact of 
one’s own actions on others’ actions 
[1–3]. Imitation recognition is thought 
to foster understanding of social 
causality, intentionality in others and 
the formation of a concept of self as 
different from other [3–5]. Pigtailed 
macaques (Macaca nemestrina) 
implicitly recognize being imitated 
[6], but unlike chimpanzees [7], they 
show no sign of explicit imitation 
recognition. We investigated imitation 
recognition in 11 individuals from 
the four species of non-human great 
apes. We replicated results previously 
found with a chimpanzee [7] and, 
critically, have extended them to 
the other great ape species. Our 
results show a general prevalence of 
Figure 1. Experimenter and female orangutan 
(Pongo pygmaeus) interacting in the contin-
gent/matching condition showing an exam-
ple of testing behaviour (testing pose).
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and thereby demonstrate important 
differences between great apes and 
monkeys in their understanding of 
contingent social interactions.
In phase 1 of the study, the 
experimenter (E) interacted with 
non- human great apes (henceforth 
apes) in four different conditions 
manipulating the structural and 
temporal contingency between 
the apes’ and his actions. Testing 
behaviours are defined as actions, 
performed to test the contingent 
relationship between two interacting 
individuals [1–3]. In human children, 
these include either deliberately 
odd behaviours to test form 
contingencies or odd or repetitive 
sequences of behaviours to test 
timing contingencies [2,3,5]. Based 
on previous work [7], therefore, we 
coded testing behaviour in apes as 
behavioural patterns which were 
enacted while facing E, if they fell 
outside of the described repertoire 
of the species (for example, 
testing poses; see Figure 1), or 
were combined in non-standard 
sequences (testing sequences) or 
uncharacteristically long bouts of 
repetitions (behaviour repetitions). 
Out of 46 coded bouts of testing 
behaviour, four were testing poses, 
zero testing sequences and 42 
behaviour repetitions (for detailed 
Supplemental Experimental 
Procedures, see the Supplemental 
Data available on-line with this issue). 
Apes demonstrated more testing 
behaviours in conditions in which: E 
acted synchronous to their actions, 
compared to a two second delay; E 
repeated the apes’ action, compared 
to responding with a different action; 
and E repeated the apes’ action 
at the same time, hence matching 
timing and form of his actions to the 
apes’ actions (Figure 2A). Apes never 
displayed testing sequences. 
Based on previous work [7], we  
administered an additional test  
(phase 2) to assess whether apes 
responded to the imitative nature of 
E’s actions or to some behavioural 
peculiarity unconsciously exhibited by 
E. In this case, E either imitated the 
ape, or, observing the videotapes of 
phase 1, replicated all actions as the 
ape had exhibited them eight weeks 
earlier. Apes demonstrated more 
testing behaviours when E imitated 
their current rather than their past 
actions (Figure 2B). Of a total of 26 CM PAST
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Figure 2. Imitation recognition in great apes.
(A) Mean percentage (+SE) of total time (four trials x 30 seconds) apes spent engaged in testing 
behaviour in each of the four conditions of phase 1. Contingent/matching (CM), the experi-
menter (E) replicated all actions as the ape exhibited them; contingent/other (CO), as the ape 
performed an action, E performed a different action synchronously; delayed/matching (DM), 
E replicated all actions two seconds after the ape exhibited them; delayed/other (DO), two 
seconds after the ape performed an action, E performed a different action (CM: M = 16.49, 
SE = 3.82; CO: M = 3.15, SE = 1.40; DM: M = 2.50, SE = 1.24; DO: M = 2.47, SE = 1.40). A mixed 
ANOVA with the within-subject factors contingency (contingent/delayed) and match (match-
ing/other) and species as a between-subject factor revealed significant effects of contingency 
(F(1,7) = 11.45; p = 0.012; partial η2 = .62), match (F(1,7) = 8.94; p = 0.020; partial η2 = 0.46) and 
contingency x match (F(1,7) = 8.60; p = 0.022; partial η2 = 0.55). There were no significant differ-
ences between species and no other interactions. In the CM condition 9 of 11 animals exhib-
ited testing behaviour at least once. In the CO, DM and DO conditions, only 5/11, 3/11 and 4/11 
animals showed testing behaviour at least once. (B) Mean percentage (+SE) of total time (four 
trials x 30 seconds) apes spent engaged in testing behaviour in each of the two conditions of 
phase 2. CM (see Figure 2A); PAST: E observed the videotapes of the CM condition of phase 
1, and replicated all actions as the apes (and E) had exhibited them eight weeks earlier (CM: 
M = 19.85, SE = 6.50; PAST: M = 1.36, SE = 1.02). A repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-
subject factor condition (CM/PAST) revealed a significant main effects of condition (F(1,7) = 7.74; 
p = 0.019; partial η2 = 0.44). In the CM condition 7 of 11 animals exhibited testing behaviour at 
least once, while in the PAST condition only 2/11 animals showed any testing behaviour at all.coded bouts of testing behaviour, 
five were testing poses, zero were 
testing sequences and 21 behaviour 
repetitions. These results replicated 
those of phase 1 and showed 
that testing behaviour was indeed 
caused by the imitative quality of the 
interaction and not by inadvertently 
peculiar behaviour of E.
We found that, in response to being 
imitated, apes reliably displayed 
behaviours more closely aligned to 
the behaviours observed in human 
infants than to those observed in 
monkeys. The observed behaviours 
are interpreted as testing the structural 
and temporal contingencies of an 
interaction. Apes displayed odd 
behaviours testing form contingencies 
and repetitive sequences of behaviours 
testing timing contingencies. Unlike 
children, however, apes never exhibited 
testing sequences. Our data replicated 
previous results with a chimpanzee [7] and are consistent with the hypotheses 
that apes have the ability to explicitly 
recognize the contingency between 
actions in a social interaction and the 
directional impact of their own actions 
on others’ actions. 
Our data reveal an important 
difference between great apes and 
monkeys in understanding contingent 
social interactions. Further, the 
absence of testing sequences in our 
ape sample contrasts starkly with 
their abundance in human children 
[1–3,5], suggesting a potential species 
difference within the great apes. 
Taking a phylogenetic perspective 
[8,9], we infer that the competences 
for contingent social interactions 
increased around the time of the 
common ancestor of great apes, 
approximately 15 million years ago, 
and possibly again in the hominid line. 
The increased social competence in 
great apes relative to monkeys fits with 
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and nonsense sentences. The 
grammatical objects named concrete 
items or abstract information, and the 
sentences described transfer of the 
objects either toward the reader, away 
from the reader, or no transfer. There 
was a significant interaction such that 
participants were slower to make the 
sensible judgment, by pressing a key 
on a keyboard with the right index 
finger, when sentences described 
transfer in a direction that matched 
the direction of previous bean 
practice (p = 0.02; abstract alone, 
p = 0.04, see Figure 1 and details in 
Supplemental Data).
Repeated production or perception 
of a word results in a temporary loss 
of meaning termed semantic satiation 
[7]. If participants are covertly saying 
“toward” or “away” while performing 
the bean task, then later sentence 
comprehension might suffer because 
of the satiation phenomenon. We 
tested this alternative in experiment 
2 by replacing the bean task with 
600 trials of judging if a stimulus 
was a word (“toward” or “away”) 
or an anagram of that word. Then, 
participants judged the same 
sentences as in experiment 1. The 
absence of any interactions (ps > 0.35) 
between stimulus word and sentence 
direction indicates that the interaction 
found in experiment 1 is not due to the 
sort of verbal repetition that produces 
semantic satiation.
The concrete sentences were 
changed in experiment 3 so that they 
did not describe any movement. 
Instead, they described events that 
were near or far from the grammatical 
subject, and manipulated the 
grammatical person of the sentence 
subject (see Table S1). We replicated 
the interaction for abstract sentences 
describing transfer (although at 
p = 0.06), but now in the absence 
of concrete sentences describing 
transfer that might have biased a 
motoric interpretation of the abstract 
sentences. Furthermore, failure to find 
the critical interaction for the concrete 
sentences demonstrates that, in the 
absence of language about transfer, 
differences in location (p = 0.68) or 
grammatical subject (p = 0.11 in the 
wrong direction) do not contribute to 
the effect.
How abstract are the motor 
system controllers that the bean 
task changes? In experiment 4, 
participants moved the beans with 
the right arm and hand, but half 
Use-induced motor 
plasticity affects 
the processing 
of abstract and 
concrete language
Arthur M. Glenberg1, Marc Sato2  
and Luigi Cattaneo3
Traditional analyses of language [1] 
emphasize an arbitrary correspondence 
between linguistic symbols and their 
extensions in the world, but recent 
behavioral and neurophysiological 
[2,3] studies have demonstrated a 
processing link between a symbol and 
its extension: that is, comprehension 
of language about concrete events 
relies in part on a simulation process 
that calls on neural systems used 
in perceiving and acting on those 
extensions. It is an open question, 
however, whether this simulation 
process is necessary for abstract 
language understanding [4,5]. Here 
we report how, using a new technique 
based on use-induced neural plasticity 
[6], we have obtained evidence for a 
causal link between the motor system 
and the comprehension of both 
concrete and abstract language.
Participants were required to 
move, one at a time, 600 beans 
from a wide- mouthed container to a 
target — a narrow-mouthed container, 
an arm’s length away. The movement 
direction was either toward or away 
from the body, as determined by the 
location of the target. After moving all 
the beans, participants read nonsense 
and sensible sentences describing 
transfer of concrete objects or 
abstract information toward or away 
from themselves (see Table S1 in the 
Supplemental Data for examples). 
On measuring the time required to 
judge the sentences as sensible, we 
observed an interaction between the 
direction of previous bean movement 
and the direction of described transfer 
(toward or away) for both the concrete 
and abstract sentences. That is, 
modifying the motor system affected 
processes used in the comprehension 
of both concrete and abstract 
language.
In the first experiment, after 
moving the beans (for approximately 
20 minutes), participants read (for 
approximately 10 minutes) sensible theories arguing that dispersed social 
systems, common in great ape but not 
monkey societies, caused selection 
pressures favouring advanced social 
cognitive abilities [10].
Supplemental data
Supplemental data are available at http://
www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/
full/18/7/R288/DC1
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